Different Problems Require Different Solutions: How Air Warfare Norms Should Inform IHL Targeting Law Reform & Cyber Warfare by Robertson, Christian H., II
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 52
2019 
Different Problems Require Different Solutions: How Air Warfare 
Norms Should Inform IHL Targeting Law Reform & Cyber Warfare 
Christian H. Robertson II 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Military, War, and 
Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christian H. Robertson II, Different Problems Require Different Solutions: How Air Warfare Norms Should 
Inform IHL Targeting Law Reform & Cyber Warfare, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 985 (2019). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol52/iss4/9 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
DIFFERENT PROBLEMS REQUIRE DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS: 
HOW AIR WARFARE NORMS SHOULD INFORM IHL 
TARGETING LAW REFORM & CYBER WARFARE
Christian H. Robertson II*
On February 19, 2018, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres 
claimed that he was “absolutely convinced” that “the next war will begin with a 
massive cyber-attack to destroy military capacity . . . and paralyze basic 
infrastructure.” The Secretary-General’s greatest concern, however, is that he 
believes “there is no regulatory scheme for that type of warfare, it is not clear how 
the Geneva Convention or international humanitarian law applies to it.” 
Although Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) targeting laws
generally identify who and what States may target in war, it expressly limits itself 
to attacks affecting people and objects on land. But what about online?
This Note discusses the limited applicability of the current targeting laws to 
cyber warfare. Specifically, it asks whether the land-centric AP I targeting laws 
adequately address cyber-attacks. It analogizes the unique features of cyber warfare 
to those in air warfare. Because both cyber and air warfare, unlike land combat, 
are fought beyond the traditional battlefield and closer to civilians, are object-
prime targeting methods of warfare, and serve strategic attack objectives, AP I 
land-centric targeting laws cannot adequately regulate these types of warfare. This 
Note finds that, like airspace, the cyberspace domain is sufficiently different from 
land and, thus, requires specific rules similar to those provided under the laws of 
air warfare.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 19, 2018, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General 
Antonio Guterres spoke at the University of Lisbon about a grow-
ing concern that has perplexed both States and international hu-
manitarian law (IHL) academics for the greater part of the twenty-
first century: the threat of cyber warfare. “I am absolutely con-
vinced that, differently from the great battles of the past, which 
opened with a barrage of artillery or aerial bombardment, the next 
war will begin with a massive cyber-attack to destroy military capaci-
ty . . . and paralyze basic infrastructure.”1 Secretary-General Gu-
terres’ concern, however, is not the use of cyberspace in war but 
rather the inadequacy of current IHL to address it. “What is worse 
1. Andrei Khalip, U.N. Chief Urges Global Rules for Cyber Warfare, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-guterres-cyber/u-n-chief-urges-global-rules-
for-cyber-warfare-idUSKCN1G31Q4.
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[than the potential harm caused by cyber operations] is that there 
is no regulatory scheme for that type of warfare, it is not clear how 
the Geneva Convention or international humanitarian law applies 
to it.”2 While many agree with the Secretary-General’s prediction 
that cyber warfare will play a significant role in future conflicts, 
some—like the International Group of Experts who published 
their interpretation of the existing international law’s applicability 
to cyber operations and warfare in the Tallinn Manuals 1.0 and 
2.0—argue that the laws of war found generally within the Geneva 
Conventions and specifically within the Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I) more than adequately cov-
er cyber warfare.3 While general rules and concepts of AP I might 
readily apply to cyberspace, the laws of targeting are land-centric.4
How do the laws of land warfare address cyber-attacks and why 
should the international community endeavor for them to do so?
This Note discusses the applicability of the current AP I target-
ing laws to cyber warfare. Specifically, it asks whether the land-
centric AP I targeting laws adequately address cyber-attacks. By re-
viewing the AP I travaux préparatoires and its subsequent interpreta-
tion, this Note finds that the cyberspace domain is sufficiently dif-
ferent from land and, thus, requires specific rules similar to those 
provided under the laws of air and naval warfare. First, in Part I, 
the Note identifies the current IHL shortcomings and provides ex-
amples illustrating them. Part II relates the current cyber issue to 
unique aspects of air warfare that resulted in targeting laws distinct 
from those in land warfare. Part III then highlights the unique 
characteristics of cyber warfare and the inability of AP I targeting 
laws to address them. Having identified a need for specific cyber 
warfare targeting laws, Part IV introduces new norms and rules for 
the international community to adopt and discusses policy consid-
erations.
2. Id.
3. TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael 
N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0]; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 
2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0].
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 49, § 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 17512 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/volume-1125-I-17512-
English.pdf.
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I. TALLINN APPROACH & CYBER QUESTIONS
According to some, the current IHL regime sufficiently address-
es cyber warfare. “Despite the novelty of cyber operations and the 
absence of specific rules within the law of armed conflict explicitly 
dealing with them, the [Tallinn] International Group of Experts 
was unanimous in finding that the law of armed conflict applies to 
such activities during both international and non-international 
armed conflicts . . . .”5 The twenty international law experts who 
gathered in Tallinn, Estonia in 2013 and again in 2017 claimed
that cyber warfare did not operate beyond the reaches of IHL in a 
“legal vacuum.”6 Under this Tallinn approach, IHL covers cyber 
warfare. But what do IHL targeting laws actually say about cyber 
warfare?
Since 1977, Articles 48-56 of AP I have articulated the general 
laws of targeting. There, States incorporated the three fundamen-
tal targeting rules: distinction, necessity, and proportionality. First, 
Article 48 sets forth the rule of distinction. It provides that 
“[p]arties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civil-
ian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives . . . .”7 Through distinction arises civilian im-
munity that prohibits States from making civilians “the object of 
attack.”8 Article 49(1) defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”9 Like civilians 
and civilian populations, AP I protects “civilian objects” from being 
the “object of attack” resulting in “damage.”10 This would include 
anything that did not serve a military purpose, such as non-
combatant homes or commercial buildings like a restaurant or 
mall.
Second, the AP I targeting laws describe the proportionality 
principle, which prohibits States from causing excessive collateral 
or incidental injury or damage. Specifically, Article 51(5)(b) pro-
hibits States from attacking when such an “attack may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antic-
ipated.”11 “In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian”12 and not 
5. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 375.
6. Id. at 378.
7. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 48 (emphasis added).
8. Id. art. 51, § 2 (emphasis added).
9. Id. art. 49, § 1.
10. Id. art. 51, §5(b), art. 52, § 1 (emphasis added).
11. Id. art. 51, § 5(b) (emphasis added).
12. Id. art. 50, § 1.
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a combatant or “whether an object which is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes . . . makes an effective contribution to military ac-
tion,”13 a presumption of immunity is required.
Third, like distinction and proportionality, the principle of ne-
cessity narrows permissible targeting. AP I strictly limits “attacks” to 
“military objectives.”14 Article 52(2) prohibits attacks that do not 
“offer[] a definite military advantage.”15 In essence, States may not 
attack people or objects unless it is necessary and they avoid caus-
ing unnecessary suffering.
These three principles—distinction, proportionality, and neces-
sity—have become custom and apply generally throughout IHL to 
all methods of warfare. However, under AP I, States provided a 
specific caveat over these principles that is uniquely and solely ap-
plicable to attacks on land-based objectives:16
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea 
warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual 
civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land
but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable 
in armed conflict at sea or in the air.17
AP I is limited in certain means of warfare. Article 49(3) expressly 
restricts the targeting laws enumerated under AP I to warfare af-
fecting land and excludes from its reach targeting laws in other 
domains such as air and sea. How, then, do the AP I targeting laws 
apply to cyber warfare? How do the Tallinn experts assert that the 
cyberspace square peg fits in the AP I round hole? To better un-
derstand the issue, several scenarios illustrate the shortcomings 
under AP I targeting laws as applied to cyber warfare.
Scenario 1: In a war between State A and State B, State A’s 
cyber forces hack into the databases of a major oil exporter 
in State B and tamper with communications processing 
functions thereby disrupting its shipping data. This disrupts 
state revenue necessary to sustain State B’s war effort. How-
ever, State A causes no physical damage to the exporter’s 
personnel or property.
13. Id. art. 52, § 3.
14. Id. art. 52, § 2.
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 49, § 3.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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Scenario 2: During the same war, State B’s cyber forces up-
load a virus to a major private bank in State A, and the virus 
deletes millions of bank accounts owned by State A citizens 
that the bank controlled. Consequently, for weeks, millions 
of State A citizens are unable to access funds held by or 
credit accessed through the victim bank.
Scenario 3: In response to State B’s cyber operation, State 
A’s cyber forces direct a denial of service (DOS) operation 
against a computer-based control system of an electrical 
distribution grid in a remote State B town that primarily 
supports commercial mining operations but is located near 
a military air defense station. The operation causes the con-
trol system to stop functioning, but it causes no physical 
damage to the hardware.
In contrast to the International Group of Experts’ argument, it 
is unclear how AP I target laws would apply to these scenarios. How 
do AP I targeting laws apply to States A and B’s cyber operations—
that is, how does the Tallinn approach answer these cyber ques-
tions? Do AP I targeting laws even govern cyber warfare conducted 
on a solely virtual domain, beyond its land-centric limits under Ar-
ticle 49(3)? Would cyber tampering with communication pro-
cessing functions, deleting bank account data, or DOS operations 
against control systems constitute “attacks” or “acts of violence” as 
defined in AP I? Do communication processing functions, bank 
account data, or computer-based control systems online constitute 
“civilians,” “civilian populations,” or “civilian objects” that are im-
mune from such cyber operations? Does AP I regulate a DOS op-
eration that does not cause “violence” or “property damage”? Can
AP I targeting laws limit cyber operations against computer systems 
that have both civilian and military uses?
This Note argues that the current targeting law regime under AP 
I is insufficient because it fails to address targeting issues unique to 
cyberspace or, at least, it leaves these cyber questions up to expan-
sive interpretation. Certainly, general IHL principles apply and 
cyber warfare does not completely operate in vacuum. However,
IHL currently fails to address certain aggressive behavior unique to
cyber warfare—as illustrated above—that the international com-
munity should prohibit. While targeting principles of distinction, 
proportionality, and necessity apply generally to all methods of 
warfare, the international community should strive to define pa-
rameters specific to the cyber domain as it has under AP I for land 
warfare. Otherwise, States will increasingly develop and employ
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devastating cyber tactics and techniques with little-to-no regard for 
IHL targeting laws. 
States are not unaccustomed to reforming IHL in response to 
new means of warfare. Air warfare—barely a century old—
challenged the international community’s understanding of target-
ing laws and, as the next Part explains, States agreed on new rules. 
Much like the international community’s efforts to reform air war-
fare targeting laws, States should unite to reform targeting laws 
that are specific to cyber warfare. When new means of warfare de-
velop, new rules are often required. Different problems require 
different solutions.
II. LESSONS FROM AIR WARFARE & IHL TARGETING LAW REFORM
Like cyber warfare, the rapid development of air power changed 
how States fought war and challenged the laws of land warfare. Just 
over a century ago, States revolutionized warfare by introducing air 
power on a major scale. As air power developed, the laws of war 
were slow to keep up. These developments in the law of air warfare 
arose out of the shortcomings of traditional land-centric laws. As 
air power rapidly developed into the twentieth century, States real-
ized that they could not outright prohibit its use in war as attempt-
ed in the First Hague Convention, nor could they regulate it under 
the laws of land warfare. States would come to learn that the signif-
icant differences between air and land warfare necessitate different 
regimes of targeting laws. Problems unique to air warfare required 
different solutions.
A. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare & New Protection for Civilians
Since the invention of the hot air balloon by Joseph and Etienne 
Montgolfier in 1783, States have looked for ways to use air power 
in war. After episodes of balloon warfare in the nineteenth century, 
States agreed to prohibit military balloons from launching projec-
tiles and explosives under the First Hague Peace Convention of 
1899.18 Under this regime, States viewed hot air balloons as an ex-
tension of land warfare and regulated them accordingly.
Up until the nineteenth century, land warfare was largely limited 
to the battlefronts. There, armies seldom encountered non-
18. Declaration to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles 
and Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 
1839.
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combatants and, thus, land warfare laws did not expressly provide 
protection for “civilian populations” or “civilian objects” prior to 
the Geneva Conventions.19 Instead, Article 25 of the Hague Con-
vention only prohibited forces from attacking or bombarding 
“towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which [were] undefend-
ed. . . .”20 Additionally, armies had different incentives to protect 
non-combatants as occupying forces than air forces or navies had. 
Specifically, armies historically tried to avoid conflict with local cit-
izens to maintain order.21 Granting these non-combatants strict 
immunity from armed attack was one way of achieving such or-
der.22 These rules and incentives were specific, however, to the 
strategies and traditions of land warfare. Their applicability to air 
warfare was short-lived.
Shortly after the outbreak of World War I in 1914, forces quickly 
introduced air power to the fight. States did not limit their use of 
air power to the battlefronts, though. Instead, they also flew mis-
sions behind enemy lines and, for the first time in history, attacked 
civilians and non-combatants in the heart of enemy territory with-
out having breached the front lines of the battlefield. Germany 
used its air forces to bombard London while France conducted air 
raids on Karlsruhe and Stuttgart.23 As both sides continued their air 
assault, they ironically accused each other of violating Article 25 of 
the Hague Convention. Germany claimed that France violated the 
law against attacking undefended towns because towns like Karls-
ruhe were non-fortified towns, far from the battlefront, and there-
fore, illegitimate targets.24 Meanwhile, Britain argued that bombing 
London had no military purpose and was thus an illegitimate tar-
get.25 Despite their accusations, neither the Allies nor Germany 
could justify their attacks under the protection of the “undefended 
towns” standard set forth under the Hague Convention.
After the war, nations gathered at the Washington Conference 
of 1922 to re-evaluate the laws of air warfare. There, a Commission 
concluded that the Hague Convention of 1907 could not ade-
19. Amanda Alexander, The Genesis of the Civilian. 20 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 359, 365 
(2007).
20. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 25, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (emphasis added).
21. Jeremy Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, Navigating Conflicts in Cyberspace: Legal Lessons from 
the History of War at Sea, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 203 (2014).
22. See id.
23. J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 200–02 (1924).
24. Id.
25. M.W. ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
WARFARE 179 (1928).
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quately regulate all aspects of air warfare.26 Because States found 
air power appealing, air power was an inevitable means of warfare 
that the laws of war had to address.27 The appeal of air power was 
that it allowed States to conduct effective offensive attacks by air 
while keeping its attacking forces—i.e. pilots—beyond the reach of 
enemy defenses.28
After deliberation at the Washington Conference, the Commis-
sion drafted the Hague Rules on Air Warfare of 1923.29 Accepting 
air power as a legitimate method of warfare, the Commission 
found that its differences from land warfare necessitated special 
treatment under the laws of war.30 Among the critiques of the old 
laws, academic contemporaries highlighted the inadequacy of the 
“undefended towns” standard to provide warring States with clear 
aerial targeting guidance as among the most significant. They 
found that the standard was untenable because of the inherent dif-
ferences between air warfare and land warfare.31 Specifically, air 
warfare differs from land warfare in that it (1) operates beyond the 
boundaries of the traditional battlefield, (2) primarily targets ob-
jects instead of persons, thus, complicating distinction principles, 
and (3) serves an attack objective to reduce the adversary’s ability 
to wage war unlike land attacks that seek to capture and occupy 
land.32
26. See James W. Garner, Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare, 18 AM. J. INT’L
L. 56, 65 (1924).
27. See id. (“[T]he very potency of the airship as an instrument of destruction in war is 
such that there is no reason to believe that states will ever totally renounce the employment 
of it as an arm of combat, and restrict its use to services of exploration, observation and 
communication . . . . Any such proposal [for such rules prohibiting air warfare] must be re-
garded as purely chimerical.”).
28. See generally id. (recognizing the risk reduction that pilots in World War I experi-
enced compared to soldiers. Unlike land warfare that had to advance either through or 
around enemy forces, aircraft could fly over battlefields and bomb enemy targets with less 
resistance).
29. Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923), https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_
Hague_Rules_of_Air_Warfare. See also Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time 
of War and Air Warfare. Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 - February 
1923, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
ihl/INTRO/275?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
30. See Garner, supra note 26, at 81 (“Considering the role which aircraft seems des-
tined to play in the wars of the future and the frightful consequences which its unregulated 
use will produce, and considering both the paucity and inadequacy of the existing conven-
tional rules, the recommendations to the Commission of Jurists deserve the urgent and seri-
ous consideration of the governments to which they are addressed.”).
31. See id. at 57.
32. See id. at 70.
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1. Unique Air Domain: Closer to Civilians & 
Farther from the Battlefield
The first difference the Commission’s academic contemporaries 
noted between air and land warfare was the difference in combat 
locations.33 Unlike land warfare fought on countryside battlefields, 
air campaigns took place closer to civilians and far above land
forces. The Commission’s contemporaries recognized the en-
hanced mobility and reach that air power had and the problematic 
application of the geographically limited Hague Convention tar-
geting laws.34 As States began targeting military-supporting indus-
tries deep behind enemy lines, targeting rules tied to the presence 
of troops or the proximity to the battlefield became unworkable. 
“Land fighting is less mobile and shifting [than air warfare]; it is 
more localised geographically and the zone in which it can be re-
garded as existing is normally a fairly well-defined one.”35 Alterna-
tively, “aircraft carry . . . their own zones of operations with them
. . . . They create their battle zones as they go.”36
The Commission’s contemporaries realized that, with air power,
States now had the ability to overcome land limitations and bypass 
land force resistance.37 Air power enabled States to quickly pene-
trate enemy territories and reach civilian locales. For air forces, the 
operating environment is often in a more civilian-centric area, un-
like land forces who historically fought battles away from populat-
ed areas. Moreover, the “undefended towns” standard is a land 
force concept. The standard was determined by the presence of 
land forces or lack thereof. Specifically, the terms “defended” and 
“undefended” related to the location of land forces that created 
the battlefield. Contemporary academics believed that the opera-
tion of air power beyond the battlefield—unlike ground forces 
who formed it—required a re-evaluation of targeting rules.38
2.  Air Warfare’s Object-Prime Target Type
The Commission’s contemporaries also argued that air warfare 
requires a different governing regime because air forces primarily 
target buildings on the ground or aircraft in the sky, as opposed to 
33. See SPAIGHT, supra note 23, 198–201 (comparing British, French, German, and Ital-
ian air attack practices).
34. See id. at 203–05.
35. Id. at 205.
36. Id.
37. See Garner, supra note 26, at 64.
38. See id. at 70.
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people.39 In other words, air warfare has an object-prime target 
type. While land forces primarily target soldiers—that is, people—
air forces most often attack objects. The difference is significant for 
targeting laws in applying the distinction principle.
As discussed earlier, States may not target indiscriminately. Dis-
tinguishing between threatening and non-threatening objects in 
the vast skies is comparatively more difficult than identifying com-
batants on the battlefields.40 “[T]he danger of surprise on the part
of apparently inoffensive civil aircraft will probably impose upon 
the latter (enemy civil aircraft) special restraints as the price of 
immunity.”41
The Commission addressed the distinction issue resulting from 
air power’s object-prime targeting nature by reducing immunity 
protections generally afforded to civil aircraft. Specifically, the 
Hague Rules of Air Warfare removed the “undefended town” 
standard. The Commission’s contemporaries concluded that the 
term “defended” referred to the fortification of towns by sentries 
or armies.42 In other words, it is a combatant-prime targeting rule. 
Because attacking armies could readily identify opposing ground 
forces—such as sentinels patrolling a town or armies barricading a 
village—the undefended town standard was a feasible targeting 
approach for land warfare. It was largely ineffective for air forces, 
though, because air power primarily targets objects. From thou-
sands of feet in the air, pilots were unable to determine whether a 
town was defended by people on the ground. Moreover, air de-
fense was a relatively novel tactic that States did not formally de-
ploy during World War I. Accordingly, the unique nature of air 
warfare required a new standard.
3.  Air Attack Strategic Objective to Reduce War Waging Ability
A third major critique of applying land-centric targeting laws to 
air warfare was the inapplicability of the “undefended town” stand-
ard to aerial combat. According to the Commission’s academic 
contemporaries, the term “defended” under the Hague Conven-
tion related directly to the military purpose of land forces: to cap-
ture and occupy land.43 In other words, a town was only “defended” 
or “undefended” when forces capable of inducing its surrender 
39. See SPAIGHT, supra note 23, at 205, 217.
40. See id. at 217.
41. 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law 309, 530 (H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1952).
42. See SPAIGHT, supra note 23, at 213-14.
43. See Garner, supra note 26, at 70.
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and occupation confronted it. This was not the objective of air 
forces. Instead, States deployed air warfare to “simply destroy the 
place or certain person or things in it.”44
The Commission’s contemporaries believed—as many do to-
day—that air power serves a more strategic role of reducing an ad-
versary’s ability to wage war by, among other things, crippling its 
infrastructure or reducing its military industrial output.45 Flying 
thousands of feet above targets without the objective or ability to 
capture and occupy towns, air warfare rendered the “undefended 
town” standard inapplicable.46 The Commission’s contemporaries 
found that “[t]he distinction between ‘defended’ and ‘undefend-
ed’ places as a test of liability to bombardment is reasonable 
enough in land and naval warfare, but when applied to aerial 
bombardment it is illogical and even absurd.”47 Because air warfare
did not seek to capture or occupy towns like land forces did, the 
Commission’s contemporaries concluded that the “undefended 
town” standard did not apply and, therefore, certain aspects of air 
warfare required different targeting laws.48
4.  New Air Warfare Targeting Rules
These differences between air and land warfare led to IHL re-
form. After the Washington Conference, the Commission drafted 
and proposed the Hague Rules of Air Warfare. This set of rules in-
cluded two significant changes. First, Article 14(1) introduced the 
distinction between military objectives and civilian objects:
Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a 
military objective, that is to say, an object of which the de-
struction or injury would constitute a distinct military ad-
vantage to the belligerent.49
Second, Article 14(4) made air bombardment of “cities, towns, vil-
lages . . . or buildings” legitimate provided that they were “in the 
immediate neighborhood of the operation of land forces” and with 
“regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian population.”50
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 70-72.
49. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, supra note 29, art. 14, § 1.
50. Id. at § 4.
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These two concepts reformed targeting rules as they applied to 
air power. The international community recognized air power’s 
unique operating environment closer to civilians and behind ene-
my lines, its distinction issues, and its strategic purpose of targeting 
its adversary’s military infrastructure or industrial output.
Due to the different nature of air warfare, prior land targeting 
laws failed and required change. In World War I, States like Britain 
and Germany abused the “undefended towns” standard of protec-
tion and launched air assaults on cities far behind the fronts. 
Aware that air power was not going away, States reformed the rules 
and created the Hague Rules of Air Warfare. Instead of applying 
old solutions to new problems, the Washington Commission iden-
tified key differences between the then-existing laws and the new 
effects of air warfare.
B. AP I & the Limited Regulation of 
Air Warfare Targeting Laws
Although the Hague Rules of Air Warfare never became a treaty, 
States eventually memorialized their revolutionary features in AP I. 
Due to the increasing concerns created by air—as opposed to 
land—warfare, the international community convened to create 
AP I. “[T]he principal area of concern which motivated the initia-
tives that led to [AP I] . . . was a shared need to formulate more ef-
fective rules to protect the civilian population and individual civil-
ians from the effects of attacks in light of the development of air 
power.”51
The drafters of AP I noted that “air power vastly extended the 
depth of the ground battle areas” beyond those seen in land war-
fare.52 While the drafters noted the significance of air power’s 
reach into enemy territory, States were more concerned with tar-
geting laws applicable to effects on land and objected to creating 
one, all-encompassing targeting law.53 “[C]ountries with substantial 
navies who believed it would be dangerous to attempt a revision of 
existing treaty and customary law on . . . attacks of enemy mer-
chant ships” strongly resisted an all-encompassing targeting law.54
51. See BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON 
THE TWO 1997 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 315 (2d
ed. 2013) (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. See CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
at 634 (Yves Sandos et al. eds., 1987).
54. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 51, at 331.
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During negotiations, some States believed that land warfare laws 
could regulate air warfare because of its connection to land, name-
ly its air-to-ground bombing function. The majority of States, how-
ever, emphasized that air warfare also operates in two other do-
mains: at sea and in air. These distinct functions of air persuaded 
States to refrain from broadly applying AP I targeting laws to all air 
operations. In response to the land effect concerns, States agreed 
to limit the applicability of AP I targeting laws to attacks “on land” 
and exclude air-to-air operations as well as naval combat solely at 
sea.55
C. Air-to-Air Targeting Laws Under the Air & 
Missile Warfare Manual
As discussed, AP I art. 49(3) expressly limits its applicability to 
warfare targeting civilians, civilian populations, and civilian objects 
on land. Because States found air warfare so uniquely different 
from land, they left one of the primary functions of air power out-
side the scope of AP I: air-to-air combat. This carveout has resulted 
in different targeting laws for air-to-air combat. Specifically, under 
the Manual of Air & Missile Warfare (“AMW Manual”), air-to-air 
targeting rules have fewer restrictions on attacking enemy civilian 
aircraft than AP I has on targeting civilians on land.56 Much like 
the Washington Commission had recognized years before, States 
made this distinction because of the inherent differences between 
air and land combat.57
The AMW drafters agreed with the Commission’s understanding 
of the air domain as uniquely distinct from land and created air at-
tack rules for targeting civilian objects that were more lenient than 
land-based rules.58 Additionally, States like the United States and 
United Kingdom have maintained the difference in objectives be-
55. See id.; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 49, § 3.
56. See generally PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND 
MISSILE WARFARE (2013) (revealing that, for example, the AMW Manual permits combat 
aircraft to attack other aircraft normally dedicated to civilian purposes if the pilot has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the aircraft has become a military objective. Conversely, AP I 
presumes that unidentified objects or persons are not lawful targets when the attacking 
combatant is in doubt).
57. MARCO SASSOLÍ ET AL., Air Warfare, in HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/law/air-warfare#_ftnref_020 (com-
menting on the AMW Manual by stating that the “[r]ules for attacks on targets on land 
which specify them, must be ‘proved by reference to the peculiar conditions of air warfare.’
In this respect, the Manual on Air and Missile Warfare helps identify in what respect the de-
tails must be adapted to the physical realities of the air environment.”).
58. See id.
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tween air and land attacks.59 Specifically, they define the objectives
of air force strategic attack to be reducing their adversary’s ability 
to wage war rather than capturing and occupying land.60
As apparent from the AMW Manual, air-to-air combat has re-
quired different targeting laws. For reasons unique to air power, 
such as its domain beyond the battlefield, its object-prime target-
ing, and its strategic attack objective, AP I targeting laws are not 
applicable to air-to-air combat. States and international law experts 
should not seek to place domain-specific targeting laws on other 
methods of warfare. Like airspace, cyberspace has significant dif-
ferences from land warfare. Thus, warfare conducted solely online 
or within the cyber domain should have different targeting laws 
that adequately address the unique problems it presents.
III. NEW PROBLEMS IN CYBER WARFARE
Just as air power extended the effects of war to the skies and be-
yond the traditional battlefield, cyber capabilities similarly bring 
new challenges distinct from those inherent in land warfare. Nev-
ertheless, some States and experts like the Tallinn Group continue 
to assume the laws of war under AP I targeting law sufficiently cov-
er cyber operations much as States did for air power before 1923. 
However, like air power, cyber warfare operates beyond the 
boundaries of the traditional battlefield, primarily targets objects 
instead of people, and serves attack objectives to reduce the adver-
sary’s ability to wage war unlike land attacks that seek to capture 
and occupy towns. These similar features should inform the inter-
national community’s process of rethinking cyber warfare targeting 
laws. Specifically, States should rethink cyber targeting laws and (1)
distinguish cyber operations beyond the domain of AP I, (2) define 
“objects” protected from the cyber warfare, and (3) identify what 
constitutes a “cyber-attack.”
59. Compare SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-70 (2011) 
[hereinafter AFDD 3-70], https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3-70.pdf (describing the 
objective of a “Strategic (Air) Attack” as “to weaken [the] adversary’s ability or will to engage 
in conflict.”), with MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 0-30
(2d ed. 2017) (U.K.) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PUBLICATION 0-30],
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/668710/doctrine_uk_air_space_power_jdp_0_30.pdf (defining “Stra-
tegic (Air) Attack” as an “[attack] aimed at an adversary’s fundamental ability to wage war, 
by attacking their structures or organisations” and claiming that “[t]argets may include cen-
tres of gravity, such as leadership and command elements, critical war production resources 
or key supporting infrastructure.”).
60. See AFDD 3-70, supra note 59, at 49; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE PUBLICATION 0-30, supra
note 59, at 33.
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A. The Cyberspace Domain Beyond AP I but Closer to Civilians
Like air warfare, Article 49(3) excludes the applicability of AP I 
targeting laws to certain attacks within cyberspace. As discussed 
above, AP I targeting laws only apply to “warfare which may affect 
the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on 
land” and not to attacks conducted in other domains.61 It is un-
clear, however, whether certain cyber operations “affect [targets] 
on land” such that AP I applies. To resolve this issue, States and ac-
ademics alike have sought to define “cyberspace.” However, even if 
cyberspace requires a different definition, one must then ask why it 
should receive different targeting laws. That, like the deep pene-
tration of air forces beyond the battlefront in World War I, is be-
cause cyberspace is much closer in proximity to civilians than the 
traditional battlefield and, thus, requires a different analysis.
1.  Defining Cyberspace Beyond the Land Battlefield
According to the Tallinn experts, cyberspace is “[t]he environ-
ment formed by physical and non-physical components to store, 
modify, and exchange data using computer networks.”62 Under the 
Tallinn definition, a portion of cyber operations—those formed by 
the “non-physical” components—escape AP I’s regulation. Unlike 
“physical” components such as computers, servers, or other land-
based objects, “non-physical storage, modification, and exchange” 
of digital data occurs in a virtual domain online. For air warfare, 
the international community understood that it could have effects 
on land and, therefore, it included of air-to-ground attacks under 
the targeting laws of AP I. At the same time, States recognized op-
erations that occurred solely outside the land domain such as the 
air-to-air combat discussed earlier or, perhaps, operations that oc-
cur through the non-physical components of cyberspace. Rejecting 
universal AP I targeting laws, States removed air-to-air from its 
reach. Similarly, operations through the non-physical component 
of cyberspace—that is, “cyber-to-cyber”—are beyond the specific 
targeting norms set forth under AP I.
The United States defines cyberspace as more distinct from oth-
er domains than the Tallinn experts do. The United States De-
partment of Defense Law of War Manual defines “cyberspace” as a 
“global domain within the information environment consisting of 
interdependent networks of information technology infrastruc-
61. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 49, § 3.
62. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 564.
SUMMER 2019] Different Problems Require Different Solutions 1001
tures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunica-
tions networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers.”63 The significance of the U.S. definition is that it clear-
ly separates cyber-attacks from existing domains of war. The United 
States distinguishes the “global domain” as “a new domain of war-
fare” separate from “land, sea, air, and space.”64 Under the U.S.
definition, cyber operations operate largely in a new domain, be-
yond the traditional battlefield, with problems inherently different 
from those addressed under AP I’s targeting laws.
2.  Cyberspace in Closer Proximity to Civilians
The understanding of the cyber domain has varied amongst ac-
ademics. Some argue that the cyber/land distinctions are irrele-
vant under the AP I so-called “Martens Clause”65 and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion in Nuclear Weapons.66 Under 
the Martens Clause, proponents of AP I argue that IHL’s failure to 
expressly prohibit warfare that subjects civilians and combatants to 
violence against “custom[,] . . . the principles of humanity and . . .
the dictates of public conscience” are nevertheless regulated by the 
general principles of IHL.67 The ICJ upheld the effectiveness of
Martens Clause in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. There, the 
Court held that the Martens Clause was “an effective means of ad-
dressing the rapid evolution of military technology” involved in 
nuclear warfare.68
Accordingly, many argue that cyber is merely a new weapon that 
AP I covers as prescribed under the Martens Clause and as under-
stood in Nuclear Weapons. The problem, however, is not the exist-
ence of generally applicable targeting rules under IHL—such as 
distinction, proportionality, and necessity—but the lack of specific 
rules that encourage compliance. Professor Marco Roscini claims 
that “[t]he problem with the extension of existing rules and prin-
ciples to new scenarios such as cyber operations is that they do not 
take into account their uniqueness and might prove to be too gen-
63. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL para. 16.1.1, at 1012 (2015) 
(citing Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, at GL-4, (Feb. 5, 2013)).
64. Id. at 1012 n.3 (citing William J. Lynn III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defending a 
New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 97, 101 (Sept./Oct. 2010)).
65. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 47 n.52 (2015).
66. See id. at 40.
67. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1, § 2.
68. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
104, ¶ 78 (July 8, 1996).
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eral” for States to follow.69 When States seek to graft old, general 
rules onto new, specific problems, there are both intentional and 
practical concerns regarding compliance. First, some States might 
intentionally abuse AP I targeting laws as they would be applied to 
cyber because the laws are overly general. Second, and perhaps the 
greater concern, is that many States willing to comply will be una-
ble to because AP I’s vagueness as applied to cyber would deprive 
them of any practical guidance.
As the land-centric “undefended towns” standard during air 
campaigns in World War I proved to be impractical for air warfare, 
current AP I targeting laws will likely prove to be too general with-
in the cyberspace domain. Like air warfare, and unlike land war-
fare, cyber operations are conducted in close proximity to civilians.
According to studies gathered by Professor Robin Geiss, “approxi-
mately 98 per cent of US government communications use civilian-
owned and operated networks.”70 Cyber warfare is closer to civil-
ians than any form of warfare has ever been. Unless States reform 
targeting laws to adapt to cyber warfare beyond AP I, there will 
likely not be a deployable understanding of what constitutes an 
“object” protected from cyber operations and whether those oper-
ations even amount to an “attack” regulated by IHL.
Through similarities in the Tallinn and U.S. definitions in cyber-
space, this Note argues that cyber operations conducted in the 
“global domain within the information environment consisting of 
interdependent networks of information technology” through 
“non-physical components to store, modify, and exchange data” 
fall outside the specific rules of AP I targeting laws. Under this as-
sertion, all the cyber operations illustrated in Scenarios 1-3 in Part 
II would likely fall outside the scope of specific targeting laws in AP 
I. State A could claim that tampering with an oil exporter’s com-
munications processing functions online occurs on a “non-physical 
component” of data exchange and storage. State B might similarly 
argue that deleting bank account data does not reach the “physical 
component” that triggers land warfare targeting laws. State A 
might have the weakest claim under Scenario 3: that its DOS oper-
ation is beyond the scope of AP I because of the effects its opera-
tion had on an electrical grid control system. State A might, never-
theless, assert that the control system is an online, virtual function 
that does operate in the physical sense. Even if its claim is unper-
suasive, the unclear nature of AP I art. 49(3) would make it diffi-
69. MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
23 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
70. Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Cyber Warfare: Applying the Principle of Distinction 
in an Interconnected Space, 45 ISRAEL L REV. 381, 386 (2012).
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cult for State B to condemn the cyber operation. Finally, notwith-
standing the domain issues, even if we assume these cyber opera-
tions fall within the AP I purview, AP I targeting laws do not ade-
quately address these scenarios.
B. Civilian Intangible Property & Regulated “Objects”
AP I art. 52 regulates attacks on civilian “objects”, but what con-
stitutes an “object”?71 Does its meaning even matter when Article 
52(3) limits attacks to objects which by their “nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction . . . offers a definite military 
advantage”?72 Under the ICRC’s understanding, and even that of 
the Tallinn experts, the meaning of “object” matters. According to 
the ICRC’s Commentary to AP I, “objects” under AP I refers only 
to “visible and tangible” things.73 Pursuant to the ICRC Commen-
tary, the Tallinn experts concluded that “[d]ata is intangible and 
therefore neither falls within the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term 
object, nor comports with the explanation of it offered by the 
ICRC.”74
What does this limitation mean for cyber warfare? States, argua-
bly, have greater targeting options with respect to data than any 
other target. The Tallinn experts define “data” as “[t]he basic ele-
ment that can be processed or produced by a computer to convey 
information . . . the fundamental digital data measurement is a 
byte.”75 Data would include processing functions, programming 
language, command algorithms, and mere informational data.
This understanding of protected “objects” provides States A and 
B with significant interpretive latitude in Part II Scenarios 1-3. For 
State A in Scenario 1, the oil exporter’s online communications 
processing might not be an “object” safe from attacks. There, State 
B might have a strong argument that the processing is operated 
through its tangible computer hardware; however, if the commu-
nications processing is only a series of command functions it likely 
would not constitute an “object.” The same analysis would likely 
apply to State A’s cyber operations against the electrical grid con-
trol system in Scenario 3, although State B’s “object” claim would 
likely be more persuasive because of the significant infrastructure 
71. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52.
72. Id. at § 2.
73. PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 53.
74. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 437.
75. Id. at 564.
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involved in an electrical grid. On the other end of the spectrum, 
State B’s targeting of State A’s bank accounts in Scenario 2 would 
likely constitute intangible objects not protected under AP I. As 
Secretary-General Guterres feared, cyber operations targeting 
these types of data are likely vulnerable under the AP I shortcom-
ings.
C. Cyber Operations Short of “Attacks”
AP I art. 49(1) defines “attacks” as “acts of violence against the 
adversary.”76 Like the term “object”, does the meaning of “attacks” 
limit the scope of AP I targeting laws in cyber warfare? Is denying 
software processing or deleting online data an “attack”? There are 
two primary issues with the meaning of “attack” in cyber warfare: 
first, the focus on means (force applied) or ends (resulting harm) 
and second, whether loss of use or function without damage or in-
jury even amounts to an attack.
1.  Cyber-Attacks Determined by Force Applied or 
Resulting Harm
Under the Commentary to AP I, the commentators explained 
that the word “attacks” “applies to those aspects of military opera-
tions which most directly affect the safety of the civilian population 
and the integrity of civilian objects.”77 The objectives of “safety” and 
“integrity” coincide respectively with the protections from “injury 
to civilians” and “damage to civilian objects” under Article 
51(5)(b).78 Under the Commentary explanation, “attacks” and 
“acts of violence” prohibited “denote[] physical force.”79 Moreover, 
and perhaps most significant to the understanding of cyber-attacks, 
the Commentary to AP I explained that “the concept of ‘attacks’ 
does not include . . . non-physical means of psychological, political, 
or economic warfare.”80 In light of the AP I Commentary, AP I-
regulated “attacks” appears to limit its meaning to physical means 
of warfare.
The Tallinn experts disagree with this means-based definition of 
“attacks.” Instead, the experts claimed that the “consequential 
76. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 49, § 1.
77. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 51, at 328 (emphasis added).
78. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51, § 5(b).
79. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 51, at 329.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
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harm” bears more on the understanding of an attack.81 To support 
their assertion, the experts cite, first, the international communi-
ty’s recognition of non-kinetic chemical, biological, and radiologi-
cal operations as attacks and, second, the consequence-based focus 
throughout the AP I targeting laws.
First, the experts cite the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) interpretation of chemical attacks in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic.82 There, the court found that chemical opera-
tions constitute “attacks” under AP I even if they do not usually 
have a kinetic effect on their designated target.83 States, however, 
might easily distinguish cyber operations from chemical attacks by 
contending that no harm befell any person or tangible property. 
Unlike chemicals that have injurious effects on the human body 
and the natural environment, a cyber DOS operation generally 
does neither unless it reasonably led to consequences that physical-
ly manifested.
The Tallinn experts’ second effects-based argument cites the AP 
I language that focuses primarily on the consequences of “attacks” 
that the targeting laws seek to protect rather than focusing on the 
force applied.84 Specifically, the proportionality principle ex-
pressed under Article 51(5)(b) speaks of “loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.”85
While strongly supported by the international community, this un-
derstanding of the term “attacks” does not appear to address non-
physical consequences to intangible objects. It might, nevertheless, 
regulate cyber operations that States might reasonably expect to 
result in such physical harm.
This “reasonable expectations of harm” understanding of “at-
tacks” is based in text and logic. Under AP I art. 56, “[w]orks or in-
stallations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object 
of attack, even when these objects are military objectives.”86 This 
categorical restriction on targeting dams, dykes, and nuclear elec-
trical generating stations supports the Tallinn experts’ assessment 
of “attacks.” In other words, if the attacking State launches cyber 
operations against a dam control-system—which is critical to pre-
venting flooding—the consequential injury to persons or damage 
81. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 416.
82. Prosecutor v. Tadiü, Case No. IT-94-1-ar72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995).
83. Id.
84. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 3, at 416.
85. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51, § 5(b) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at art. 56, § 1.
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to property would indicate an attack occurred. While AP I might 
adequately cover this aspect of cyber warfare, it still fails to regulate 
those that do not target such prohibited works and installations. 
For example, the reasonable expectations of harm test would not 
cover cyber-to-cyber operations targeting only data management 
industries. If a State launched a cyber operation against another 
State’s banking industry, there would likely be no reasonable ex-
pectation of personal injury or physical damage. Although this op-
eration will cause economic loss, it does not fit within the confines 
of AP I.
2.  Cyber-Attacks & Loss of Use
The second question concerning cyber operations and attacks is 
whether an object’s loss of use rather than damage or injury consti-
tutes an attack. This is particularly relevant to the realm of cyber 
warfare because of the standard technique of DOS. A DOS opera-
tion is technically reversible and only temporarily renders the tar-
geted system inoperable. Theoretically, there are three approaches 
to this question. First, and most limited, some might claim that 
cyber-attacks are limited to operations that cause violence to per-
sons or physical damage to objects. Second, a cyber-attack occurs if 
the object targeted requires restoration to function again. Third,
and most expansive, any operation that merely leaves an object 
without function constitutes an attack—that is, a type of functional-
ity test.
Taken at face value, the text of Article 49(1) defining “attacks” 
strongly suggests that “violence” or physical injury or damage must 
occur. This appears to suggest the first and most limited approach 
discussed above. However, Article 52(2)’s discussion of attacks that 
result in target “neutralization”87 supports the functionality test 
under the third approach. Under the Commentary to AP I, the 
word “neutralization,” “insofar as it deals with bombardment, re-
fers to an attack for the purpose of denying the use of an object to 
the enemy without necessarily destroying it.”88 To illustrate its 
meaning, the commentators provided an example where “enemy 
artillery or surface-to-air missiles may be neutralized for a sufficient 
time to prevent their interference with a planned operation by fir-
87. Id. at art. 52, § 2 (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers 
a definite military advantage.”).
88. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 51, at 367 (emphasis added).
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ing anti-personnel munition at such targets in attempt to force gun 
crews to take shelter.”89 States could argue both that the Commen-
tary’s explanation provides for a broader understanding of an “at-
tack” that includes DOS operations and for a narrower under-
standing that excludes it. In the former instance, a State might cite 
the clear language of denial within the meaning of neutralization
that clearly makes DOS an attack. Alternatively, States might un-
derstand—like the Commentary—the term “neutralization” as lim-
ited to instances “insofar as [they] deal[] with bombardment.” The 
generality of the term denies States and the international system 
with a workable rule. Moreover, opponents of the “functional test”
of attacks can argue that, because electronic jamming operations90
typically do not constitute attacks, neither should DOS opera-
tions.91
AP I’s use of the term “attacks” was likely limited to physical at-
tacks on land. Having identified how AP I “attacks” resulting in 
“personal injury” or “physical damage” have limited application to 
cyber operations conducted virtually, it is easy to see how States 
might push the limits, disregard, or misunderstand AP I targeting 
laws in Scenarios 1-3 of Part II. In Scenario 1, State A’s tampering 
with the oil exporter’s communications processing functions likely 
does not rise to the “physical” violence in the means-based under-
standing nor does it likely result in “injury” or “damage.” State B’s
virus in Scenario 2, however, might come closest to resembling a 
conventional attack. Deleting or erasing data is akin to destruction 
that AP I generally prohibits. In Scenario 3, State A’s DOS opera-
tion arguably would not rise to the level of an attack. Under the 
loss of use or functionality test, an attack would have occurred. 
However, the Commentary to AP I qualifies “neutralization” to in-
stances of “bombardment.” Moreover, this DOS operation strongly 
resembles electronic jamming that does not result in an attack. 
Applying these Scenarios to the unique challenges of cyber warfare 
illustrates the need to rethink cyber-specific targeting laws. The in-
ternational community should rethink the new problems that re-
quire new solutions.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Electronic jamming, included under the broader category of electronic warfare, 
involves the deliberate radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of 
disrupting enemy use of electronic devices or systems, such as radio signals or radar.
91. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 65, at 41–42.
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IV. RETHINKING CYBER WARFARE TARGETING LAW NORMS
Cyber warfare is simply different from land warfare. Its domain 
and operating environment, primary target, and attack objectives 
are different from those for which States created AP I targeting 
laws. History has shown us how targeting laws are domain-specific 
and fail to adequately cover certain aspects of other means of war-
fare such as air combat. If target issues arise based on the method’s
primary target, then different targeting laws should apply. When 
States recognized the objective of air power to reduce the adver-
sary’s ability to wage war instead of capturing and occupying land, 
they re-evaluated the land-centric targeting laws under the Hague 
Convention. Similarly, States must recognize that the objective of 
cyber warfare is not to capture and occupy territory but rather to 
harass, deny, or degrade an adversary’s virtual capabilities. To the 
extent that cyber-attacks do not manifest themselves in physical 
damage or personal injury, AP I is insufficient and States should 
create specific cyber targeting rules.
A. Defining Cyberspace Domain
One of the greatest issues with cyber warfare is the lack of exist-
ing definitions. Unlike other areas of IHL, cyber warfare is mostly 
theoretical and, therefore, unfamiliar to the world. As highlighted 
throughout this Note, States and non-state actors alike have varying 
understandings of what cyberspace is. Moreover, methods of war-
fare often have multiple sides with different treatment. As present-
ed, AP I governs air-to-ground attacks but not air-to-air attacks.92 A
proper definition of cyberspace should include, as the Tallinn ex-
perts express, a “physical” and “non-physical” component. Like air 
and naval warfare, cyber operations can have effects on land—that 
is, vis-à-vis its physical component. This definitional point is signifi-
cant to the clear application of AP I targeting rules to the cyber-
attacks that result in injury of civilians or damage to objects. Addi-
tionally, the definition should explicitly invoke AP I targeting laws 
to cover the physical components of cyberspace. This would in-
clude physical components such as hardware, servers, terminals, 
land-lines, etc.
Politically, the advantages start with clarity. States have largely 
operated and developed cyber capabilities without clear guidance 
about permissible and impermissible targeting. By creating two 
92. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 49, § 3.
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components—the physical and non-physical—States can not only 
develop specifically permissible targeting capabilities, but they can 
also focus cyber defense strategies. If the regime had two compo-
nents, it would encourage States to invest in and implement rela-
tively more aggressive counter-cyber defense systems that only op-
erate within the non-physical component of cyberspace. In 
essence, these are systems built for cyber-to-cyber engagements. 
This will greatly reduce State vulnerabilities.
The disadvantage of this proposal is possibly creating a more le-
nient targeting standard for operations conducted in the non-
physical component of cyberspace that States might abuse. Differ-
ing definitions would likely create different standards and, thus, 
incentives for States to opportunistically apply the one that fits 
their strategy. For instance, States might claim that they conduct all 
their cyber operations through the non-physical component to 
employ more devastating uses of cyber without committing acts of 
war. However, this aspect of differing standards is not new to 
States. As highlighted by AP I art. 49(3), means of air and naval 
warfare are governed by more lenient standards. For example, air 
combatants can use incendiary weapons in air combat, which are 
prohibited on land. Additionally, the broader targeting rights in 
air-to-air combat, as discussed in Part III, have not led to significant 
targeting law abuses.93
B. Creating Protection for Essential Civilian Intangible Property
AP I’s focus on protecting “tangible and visible” civilian objects 
ignores an essential target of most cyber operations: data. Whether 
it is processing data, command functions, or substantive data, AP I 
targeting laws leave States and their civilian populations vulnera-
ble. This is significant because intangible objects are the primary 
target of cyber-attacks. As air power is tangible object-prime, cyber 
operations is intangible object-prime. Data is the primary target,
whether the aggressor seeks to deny its use or delete it altogether.
This Note proposes the inclusion of “essential civilian intangible 
objects” to the immunity list. Under this rule, “essential civilian in-
tangible objects” would include “economic, political, and infra-
structure data.” This definition would protect the private sector 
and information essential to everyday life. States, both with large 
and small militaries, will have incentives to protect their economies 
and political organizations from cyber operations. This is in line 
93. See SASSOLÍ ET AL., supra note 57.
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with the distinction principle accepted more than a century ago. 
The issue, however, might be that the definition of “objects” goes
too far such that the definition could immunize civilian objects his-
torically subject to lawful attack when serving both military objec-
tives. For instance, States could argue that certain intangible items 
like the media are protected even though they use it to coordinate 
military communications. States should, nevertheless, be able to 
overcome this concern by applying the military necessity principle 
to objectives permissible in cyber warfare.
Additionally, this immunity, along with the general scope of this 
Note, should be limited to jus in bello targeting laws. Essential civil-
ian intangible objects targeted in commercial hacking or other 
cyber operations short of war are not protected under this rule. In-
stead, there, the jus ad bellum laws on “attacks” control.
C. Expressly Adopting the “Functional” Approach to the 
“Attack” Definition
The definition of “attacks” under a cyber warfare targeting law 
regime should expressly include the functional approach—or loss 
of use—and formally adopt the Tallinn Experts’ understanding of 
neutralization. States should expressly adopt this definition for 
cyber targeting laws because, contrary to the Tallinn experts’
claim, AP I targeting laws do not clearly extend to temporary and 
reversible functional losses. States created AP I targeting laws to 
address “loss of life” and “physical damage” of then-existing war-
fare. Unlike both land and air warfare, however, DOS and other 
neutralizing attacks are likely to be the norm rather than the ex-
ception in cyber warfare. Because such denials can also conse-
quently result in serious works or installation damages, neutraliza-
tion is more dangerous in cyber warfare and, thus, should be 
regulated as an attack.
D. Application to Cyber Issues
Under this new regime, each of the cyber operation Scenarios 
would be regulated. In State A’s tampering with the oil exporter’s
communications processing systems, such tampering would be a 
“functional” attack that the proposed targeting law reforms would 
limit. State B’s deletion of the private bank accounts would be an 
impermissible attack on “essential civilian intangible objects.” Fi-
nally, State A’s DOS attack on the electrical grid control system 
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would likely be a “functional” attack that is governed by the pro-
posed regime.
While concerns might arise that these targeting rules cover more 
than they should, it will likely be to the benefit of States with ad-
vanced militaries for cyber targeting laws to cover more. States with 
advanced militaries tend to have relatively advanced economies. 
Today, those economies rely upon data security and civilian confi-
dence in the markets in order to operate. These advanced eco-
nomic States will likely want to protect aspects of their economy 
that they rely upon to a stronger extent than will developing States. 
Similarly, cyber capabilities today have somewhat leveled the play-
ing field. Individuals in less advanced States can now attack aspects 
of powerful States’ infrastructures by simply uploading a virus. Ac-
cordingly, advanced States are comparatively more vulnerable to 
attacks on data. They should be more willing to accept the com-
paratively lesser risk of new cyber targeting rules’ over-coverage 
over the serious economic risk to their cyber-dependent industries.
CONCLUSION
For years now States and academics both have convened to dis-
cuss cyber warfare under international law. As is the case in many 
international law initiatives, different political and economic inter-
ests discourage States from creating significant changes. In the face 
of inertia, groups such as the Tallinn experts nobly seek to fill the 
legal voids by claiming that existing law covers the current prob-
lem. Although this approach eliminates any “legal vacuum” in 
which new problems might operate, it renders the solution too 
general to effectively govern the nuances of modern warfare. States 
and academics must still strive to create rules in war that eliminate 
unnecessary suffering. This Note does not advocate, however, that 
States seek all-encompassing definitions of or absolute bans on cer-
tain acts of cyber warfare. The legal pendulum should not swing to 
the other extreme and become so specific that it rarely applies. In-
stead, this Note suggests a new approach for States to take when 
considering cyber warfare laws. To adequately understand both the 
need to have cyber targeting laws and to have a set distinct from AP 
I’s land warfare laws, States should consider cyber warfare’s unique 
domain, primary targets, and attack objectives as they did for air 
warfare.
After World War I, J.M. Spaight claimed that air warfare was 
unique and required special rules to properly govern it. “It now 
remains to show why it is better to proceed by creating a new and 
special code . . . rather than by building upon and adding to the
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rules already governing land warfare.”94 Instead of resting on the 
international law agreements of the past, Spaight understood that 
air warfare was inevitable, and that States should squarely address it 
rather than succumb to inertia. Like air power, cyber has unique 
characteristics that the current land-centric AP I cannot fully regu-
late. States have an incentive to define and limit cyber operations 
before cyber warfare targets State economies, infrastructure, and 
political institutions on a full scale.
Like air power, cyber operations operate beyond the boundaries 
of the traditional battlefield, primarily target objects instead of 
persons, and serve attack objectives to reduce the adversary’s ability 
to wage war unlike land attacks that seek to capture and occupy 
towns. Because of these material differences between land and cy-
berspace, new rules are required to define the domain, protect es-
sential civilian intangible objects, and identify the nature of “cyber-
attacks” to be regulated.
94. Spaight, supra note 23, at 31.
